Hackers Abused Velociraptor, Cloudflare Tunnels, Zoho Assist, and VS Code SSH to Stay Inside Networks
Microsoft incident responders found two separate threat actors operating inside the same compromised environment during a ransomware investigation, turning what first looked like a single intrusion into a much broader security case.
The main actor, tracked as Storm-2603, used a mix of legitimate tools and attacker-controlled infrastructure to maintain access. According to a Microsoft Incident Response report, the attackers deployed Velociraptor, Cloudflare tunnels, Zoho Assist, and Visual Studio Code SSH connections to create several persistence channels inside the victim network.
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A second, unrelated threat actor was also active at the same time. That group used different methods, including malicious DLL sideloading and custom backdoors, which made the breach harder to understand, detect, and contain.
Microsoft links the case to overlapping intrusion activity
Microsoft’s Detection and Response Team, also known as DART, began the investigation as a ransomware response. The team later found evidence of lateral movement beyond the first environment and into a second organization, where similar ransomware activity was also confirmed.
Storm-2603 had already been associated with attacks on internet-facing on-premises SharePoint servers. In earlier guidance, Microsoft’s SharePoint guidance said the group exploited SharePoint vulnerabilities to deploy ransomware, while other named China-linked actors also targeted exposed SharePoint systems.
In this newer case, Microsoft’s attack flow also references CVE-2025-11371. The NVD entry for CVE-2025-11371 describes the flaw as an unauthenticated local file inclusion issue affecting Gladinet CentreStack and TrioFox in default installations, with exploitation observed in the wild.
Attackers used legitimate tools to avoid standing out
The attackers did not rely only on custom malware. They used tools that security teams and administrators may already recognize, which helped malicious activity blend into normal operations.
Storm-2603 deployed Velociraptor with SYSTEM-level privileges to collect data and map the environment. Cisco Talos previously reported that ransomware operators had started abusing Velociraptor, an open-source digital forensics and incident response tool, in ransomware incidents.
The attackers then added several remote access paths. They used Cloudflare tunnels to route traffic externally, Zoho Assist for remote management, and Visual Studio Code Remote SSH to create command-and-control access. The DART case report shows those tools were part of a layered persistence strategy rather than isolated activity.
| Tool or technique | How it was used | Why defenders should care |
|---|---|---|
| Velociraptor | Used with SYSTEM privileges to collect data and map the environment | It can look like normal incident response or administrative activity |
| Cloudflare Tunnel | Used to move traffic through trusted external infrastructure | It can bypass simple perimeter-based monitoring |
| Zoho Assist | Used as a remote management channel | Remote support tools can give attackers stable hands-on access |
| VS Code Remote SSH | Used to establish SSH-based command-and-control access | Developer tools may not trigger the same alerts as malware |
| DLL sideloading | Used by the second actor to run malicious code through trusted software | It can hide malicious execution behind legitimate processes |
CVE-2025-11371 added another route into sensitive systems
The CVE-2025-11371 detail matters because local file inclusion flaws can expose sensitive configuration files. In this case, requests for files such as web.config pointed to attempts to retrieve data that could support deeper compromise.
A Huntress analysis of CVE-2025-11371 said attackers could retrieve the Web.config file from affected Gladinet systems and use exposed machine key material to support further exploitation through ViewState deserialization.
The issue affected Gladinet CentreStack and TrioFox versions prior to or including affected release ranges listed by the National Vulnerability Database. NVD also notes that the vulnerability appears in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, which signals real-world exploitation risk.
Two attackers in one network made response harder
The second threat actor used a separate playbook. Microsoft reported malicious DLL sideloading, unsigned DLL activity, custom backdoors, and signs of credential access that did not match Storm-2603’s known behavior.
This overlap created a major investigation problem. Security teams could not treat every signal as part of one clean attack chain. Some activity belonged to the ransomware actor, while other artifacts came from a separate group moving through the same environment.
Microsoft said the full picture became clear only after correlating identity, endpoint, and cloud telemetry. That point is important for defenders because isolated alerts may show only fragments of a multi-actor intrusion.
How organizations can reduce the risk
Organizations running internet-facing SharePoint servers should apply supported updates, enable security protections, and rotate ASP.NET machine keys where Microsoft guidance recommends it. The Microsoft Security blog also recommends endpoint detection and strong monitoring for exposed SharePoint systems.
Companies using Gladinet CentreStack or TrioFox should review vendor updates and mitigations linked to CVE-2025-11371. The Huntress report said Gladinet released version 16.10.10408.56683 of CentreStack with a fix for the local file inclusion issue.
Security teams should also review how legitimate administrative tools appear in their environment. Talos research shows that Velociraptor abuse has already appeared in ransomware activity, so defenders should watch not only for malware, but also for unusual use of trusted tools.
- Audit remote access tools, including Zoho Assist, Cloudflare Tunnel, VS Code Remote SSH, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, and similar utilities.
- Alert on new local administrator and domain administrator account creation.
- Investigate unexpected Velociraptor agents, services, or command-and-control connections.
- Monitor for DLL sideloading, unsigned DLLs, and suspicious files in user profile or public folders.
- Centralize endpoint, identity, VPN, cloud, and server telemetry in a SIEM.
- Retain logs long enough to reconstruct attacker activity across multiple systems.
- Test incident response playbooks before a real ransomware event begins.
The case shows why modern ransomware investigations need broad visibility. Attackers increasingly use approved tools, exposed services, and valid credentials to stay hidden. When more than one group enters the same environment, defenders need telemetry that connects identity, endpoint, network, and cloud activity into one timeline.
FAQ
Microsoft found two separate threat actors operating inside the same compromised environment. Storm-2603 used legitimate tools for persistence, while a second unrelated actor used techniques such as DLL sideloading and custom backdoors.
The attackers abused Velociraptor, Cloudflare tunnels, Zoho Assist, and Visual Studio Code Remote SSH. These tools can have legitimate business or security uses, which can make malicious activity harder to spot.
No. Storm-2603 has been linked to exploitation of on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities, but Microsoft’s case flow also references CVE-2025-11371, a local file inclusion flaw affecting Gladinet CentreStack and TrioFox.
Legitimate tools help attackers blend into normal administration activity. Security teams may not treat tools such as remote support software, tunnels, developer SSH features, or forensic agents as suspicious unless usage patterns look unusual.
Organizations should patch internet-facing systems, monitor remote access tools, restrict administrator privileges, retain telemetry centrally, alert on suspicious account creation, and test incident response playbooks regularly.
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