ClickFix Infostealer Evolves with Fake CAPTCHA Clipboard Hijacking in 2026 Campaigns


ClickFix infostealer campaigns trick users into running PowerShell commands via fake CAPTCHA pages. Compromised sites push victims to copy-paste malicious code evading file scanners. Targets browsers, crypto wallets, VPN configs with svchost.exe injection persistence.

Attack starts on legitimate compromised websites like restaurant bookings. Fake CAPTCHA prompts instruct Win+R then paste clipboard command. PowerShell downloads cptch.bin shellcode from IPs like 91.92.240.219.

Script verifies clipboard state before staging next payload. Multi-stage process uses Donut framework for memory execution. $finalPayload variable spotted triggering Microsoft Defender alerts.

Malware enumerates 25+ browsers, MetaMask, enterprise VPNs. Exfiltration skips VMs and active EDR environments. Process hollowing hides in svchost.exe via VirtualAlloc APIs.

Clipboard data (Source – Cyber Proof)

RunMRU registry hijack ensures reboot survival. Modified keys re-execute PowerShell downloading fresh payloads. Filename rotation like cptchbuild.bin dodges hash blocks.

CyberProof MDR detected late-stage alerts linking to July 2025 restaurant attacks. Patterns match recent fake CAPTCHA waves. Opportunistic operators prioritize high-value credential theft.

Infection Chain Table

StageActionTechnique
LureFake CAPTCHA pageSocial engineering
ExecutionPowerShell clipboard pasteWin+R dialog
Downloadcptch.bin shellcodeAttacker C2 IP
Injectionsvchost.exe memory allocVirtualAlloc
PersistenceRunMRU registry modReboot survival
ExfilBrowser/wallet credsVM/EDR evasion
Loading of cptch.bin (Source – Cyber Proof)

Targeted Assets

  • 25+ web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge)
  • Crypto extensions (MetaMask, Phantom)
  • VPN clients (Cisco AnyConnect, NordVPN)
  • Enterprise credentials (Outlook, RDP)
  • Desktop files, screenshots

Endpoint rules flag browser clipboard reads effectively. PowerShell AMSI bypass common but Defender catches variable errors.

Organizations train against web command execution. Hunt queries detect RunMRU anomalies and C2 traffic. EDR behavioral blocks stop shellcode loaders.

Mitigation Steps

  • Block PowerShell execution from browsers
  • Monitor clipboard API calls in processes
  • Hunt RunMRU key modifications
  • Blacklist rotating C2 domains/IPs
  • Deploy AMSI-hardened environments
  • User training on CAPTCHA commands
Persistence through RUNMRU key (Source – Cyber Proof)

Campaign monetizes via account takeovers. Corporate pivots follow initial foothold. Early 2026 activity shows sustained operator investment.

FAQ

How does ClickFix bypass AV scanners?

Manual PowerShell clipboard execution avoids file downloads.

Persistence mechanism used?

RunMRU registry forces command re-execution post-reboot.

Primary targets of stealer?

Browsers, crypto wallets, VPN enterprise configs.

C2 infrastructure spotted?

IP 91.92.240.219 hosting cptch.bin payloads.

Discovery credited to?

CyberProof MDR and Threat Hunting team.

Filename rotation examples?

cptch.bin, cptchbuild.bin evade hashes.

Readers help support VPNCentral. We may get a commission if you buy through our links. Tooltip Icon

Read our disclosure page to find out how can you help VPNCentral sustain the editorial team Read more

User forum

0 messages