Hackers Use AI Services to Hack 600+ FortiGate Devices


A Russian-speaking threat actor used commercial AI services to hack over 600 FortiGate firewalls across 55+ countries from January 11 to February 18, 2026. This group targeted exposed management interfaces with weak passwords. No zero-day exploits were needed. Basic credential stuffing worked on ports 443, 8443, 10443, and 4443.

The stolen configs revealed high-value data. Attackers grabbed SSL-VPN credentials, admin logins, network maps, IPsec VPN setups, and firewall rules. AI-powered Python scripts parsed and decrypted this info at scale. One compromised network map went straight into an AI tool for lateral movement plans.

Amazon Threat Intelligence calls this an “AI-powered assembly line for cybercrime.” The actor had medium skills but scaled attacks with two LLMs. One built tools and planned. The other guided pivots inside networks. Hits concentrated in South Asia, Latin America, West Africa, Northern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Multiple devices per org got owned, including MSP clusters.

Post-breach moves were textbook ransomware prep. Meterpreter with Mimikatz ran DCSync on domain controllers for NTLM hashes. Pass-the-hash and NTLM relay spread laterally. Veeam Backup servers faced PowerShell attacks to kill recovery options.

Attack Techniques

The group scanned with custom Go/Python recon tools. Code showed newbie errors like redundant comments and sloppy JSON. They used open-source helpers: Impacket, gogo, Nuclei.

Amazon found attacker infra at 212.11.64.250 leaking files: configs, AD maps, creds, vuln scans, AI plans. ARXON fed recon to DeepSeek and Claude for structured attack steps.

CVE IDProductCVSSDescription
CVE-2019-7192FortiOS9.8Path traversal creds access​
CVE-2023-27532Veeam Backup7.5Unauth API creds grab​
CVE-2024-40711Veeam Backup9.8RCE deserialization ​

Key Indicators

  • 212.11.64.250 (IPv4): Scanning/exploits, Jan 11-Feb 18​
  • 185.196.11.225 (IPv4): Ops hub, same dates​

Watch VPN oddities, AD replication (Event ID 4662), PowerShell on backups.
Amazon shared IOCs with partners for disruptions.

Fortinet urges: Hide management from internet, enforce MFA, rotate creds, audit AD.

Protection Steps

  • Remove mgmt interfaces from public access.
  • Mandate MFA on all admin/VPN logins.
  • Review configs for weak/reused passwords.
  • Monitor for DCSync and backup access anomalies.

FAQ

How did hackers enter FortiGate devices?

Weak creds on exposed mgmt ports. No vulns exploited.

What AI tools were used?

Commercial LLMs like DeepSeek/Claude for planning/scripts. Names partially redacted.

What data was stolen?

VPN creds, admin logins, network topology, firewall rules.

Ransomware risk?

High. Targeted backups for wipe prep.

How to block this?

MFA, no public mgmt, AD audits, anomaly detection.

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