PromptSpy: First Android Malware Uses Gemini AI for Persistence
PromptSpy marks the first known Android malware family that integrates Google’s Gemini AI model into its core execution. ESET researcher Lukas Stefanko discovered the threat in February 2026. The malware evolved from VNCSpy samples uploaded January 13, 2026 from Hong Kong.
Advanced variants appeared February 10, 2026 from Argentina with live Gemini integration. Attackers disguise PromptSpy as MorganArg, a fake Chase Bank app for “Morgan Argentina.” Distribution occurred via now-defunct mgardownload.com domain.
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ESET analysis confirms Chinese development origins through debug strings and localized Accessibility handlers. No live infections detected yet. Dedicated phishing infrastructure indicates real deployment plans.
AI-Driven Persistence Mechanism
Traditional Android malware uses fixed screen coordinates that fail across device models. PromptSpy sends live UI XML dumps to Gemini alongside natural language prompts. The AI returns precise JSON tap/swipe coordinates for any Android version or screen size.
Continuous feedback loop:
- Malware captures current UI XML
- Submits to Gemini with context prompt
- AI responds:Â
{"tap": [x:123, y:456], "action": "recent_apps"} - Executes gesture, re-queries UI
- Loop ends when app locks confirmed
Gemini pins MorganArg app with padlock icon in recent apps view. Users cannot swipe away or force-close the malware.

VNC Remote Access Capabilities
Primary payload deploys AES-encrypted VNC module for full device control. Requires Accessibility Services permission abuse.
Capabilities post-Accessibility grant:
- Lockscreen PIN/pattern video capture
- On-demand screenshots
- Installed app inventory
- Screen recording of target apps
- Foreground app reporting
C2 communication uses VNC protocol over hardcoded servers. Operators gain complete remote visibility and control.
Anti-Removal Techniques
Accessibility Services overlays invisible rectangles over uninstall/stop/clear buttons. Victims tap normally but malware intercepts silently.
Only effective removal:
textBoot Safe Mode → Settings → Apps → MorganArg → Uninstall
Regular mode reboot cycles fail due to persistent overlays.

Evolution Timeline
| Date | Location | Milestone | Samples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 13, 2026 | Hong Kong | VNCSpy precursors | 3 |
| Feb 10, 2026 | Argentina | Gemini AI integration | 4 |
| Feb 2026 | ESET | PromptSpy family named | 8 total |
Sample hashes (Android/Spy.PromptSpy.A):
textE60D12017D2DA579DF87368F5596A0244621AE86 (mgappc-1.apk)
9B1723284E311794987997CB7E8814EB6014713F (mgappm-1.apk)
076801BD9C6EB78FC0331A4C7A22C73199CC3824 (mgappn-0.apk)
8364730E9BB2CF3A4B016DE1B34F38341C0EE2FA (mgappn-1.apk)
F8F4C5BC498BCCE907DC975DD88BE8D594629909 (app-release.apk)
Infrastructure Indicators
| IP/Domain | Provider | Role | First Seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| 52.222.205.45 | Amazon | Phishing site | 2026-01-12 |
| 54.67.2.84 | Amazon | C2 server | Unknown |
| 104.21.91.170 | Cloudflare | Distribution | 2026-01-13 |
| mgardownload.com | Cloudflare | APK host | 2026-01-13 |
Threat Impact Assessment
Universal compatibility: Works across all Android devices/OS via AI adaptation
Stealth persistence: Locks app beyond user control
Remote takeover: Full VNC access post-Accessibility
Anti-removal: Intercepts uninstall attempts
Google Play Protect blocks known samples. ESET shared IOCs via App Defense Alliance.
Detection Challenges
Behavioral signatures:
textAccessibility + Gemini API calls
Recent apps padlock on banking app
VNC traffic from MorganArg
Safe Mode required for uninstall
Network patterns:
textAES-encrypted VNC to 54.67.2.84
mgardownload.com APK downloads
User Protection Measures
Immediate checks:
- Settings → Apps → MorganArg → Uninstall (Safe Mode)
- Accessibility Services → Revoke MorganArg permissions
- Recent apps → Verify no padlocked banking apps
Prevention:
textAvoid Chase-themed APKs outside Play Store
Block domains: mgardownload.com, m-mgarg.com
Review Accessibility Services permissions monthly
Enable Google Play Protect
Industry Implications
First AI-integrated Android malware signals new evasion frontier. Hardcoded prompts limit flexibility but enable universal device targeting. VNC persistence survives factory resets without root.
ESET timeline: VNCSpy precursors → Gemini adaptation → MorganArg phishing → Full PromptSpy family.
FAQ
First Android malware using Gemini AI for device-agnostic UI automation.Â
Sends UI XML to Gemini, receives JSON tap coordinates, locks app in recent view.
MorganArg fake Chase Bank app via mgardownload.com.
Yes. Accessibility overlays block normal uninstall attempts.
Simplified Chinese debug strings, Hong Kong/Argentina uploads.
PIN capture, screenshots, app inventory, screen recording.
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