AirDrop and Quick Share Vulnerabilities Could Let Nearby Attackers Crash Devices


Security researchers have disclosed six vulnerabilities in Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share that could let nearby attackers disrupt devices, manipulate protocol behavior, or crash file-sharing services.

The flaws affect proximity-sharing systems used to send files between nearby phones, tablets, computers, and PCs. Researchers found three issues in Apple AirDrop, two in Samsung’s Quick Share implementation, and one in Google Quick Share for Windows.

The findings come from researchers at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, who used reverse engineering and protocol-aware fuzzing to study how the proprietary sharing protocols handle unauthenticated nearby traffic.

What researchers found

The study, titled Protocol Prying, documents six vulnerabilities tracked in the paper as V1 through V6. The bugs span macOS, iOS, Android, and Windows implementations.

The most immediate risk comes from denial-of-service attacks. In those cases, an attacker within wireless range can send crafted protocol traffic that crashes AirDrop-related services on Apple devices or Quick Share for Windows.

The Quick Share findings also include protocol-layer weaknesses that may let an attacker interact with parts of the connection flow before proper authentication or inject certain control messages under specific conditions.

IDTargetIssue typeMain impact
V1Apple AirDropHTTP path handling errorCrash and denial of service
V2Apple AirDropUnbounded XML plist recursionStack overflow and crash
V3Apple AirDropHTTP/1.1 parser NULL pointer dereferenceCrash and continuity-service disruption
V4Samsung Quick SharePre-authentication frame dispatchProtocol-state manipulation
V5Samsung Quick ShareDevice-to-device encryption bypassUnencrypted control-frame injection
V6Google Quick Share for WindowsUse-after-free race conditionReliable crash and possible code execution

AirDrop flaws can disrupt Apple continuity services

Apple’s AirDrop lets users share photos, files, documents, and other content with nearby Apple devices using Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.

The researchers found that AirDrop’s receiving-side service exposes a network-facing attack surface when the feature is visible to nearby users. In the paper, the riskiest setting is “Everyone for 10 Minutes,” because it makes the AirDrop interface reachable by any nearby device during that window.

One AirDrop bug involves an unhandled HTTP path. A crafted request to an unexpected AirDrop endpoint can trigger a fatal error and crash the sharing daemon.

The Apple bugs are pre-authentication issues

The second AirDrop issue involves XML property lists. Researchers found that a deeply nested XML plist can exhaust the stack and crash the process because parsing lacks a safe recursion limit.

The third AirDrop issue affects HTTP/1.1 parsing in Apple’s Network.framework. Malformed request framing can put the parser into an inconsistent state and trigger a NULL pointer dereference.

According to the WOOT 2026 conference listing, the paper presents a systematic study of the AirDrop and Android Quick Share proximity transfer protocols, which researchers say had received limited application-layer security analysis because both stacks are proprietary.

  • V1 can crash AirDrop through an unexpected HTTP path.
  • V2 can crash a process through deeply nested XML plist content.
  • V3 can crash the AirDrop sharing daemon through malformed HTTP framing.
  • A crash in the sharing daemon can also disrupt related Apple continuity features.

Quick Share flaws affect Android and Windows paths

Google says Quick Share lets Android users send and receive files from nearby devices, and the feature was previously known as Nearby Share.

The research found two protocol-layer issues in Samsung’s Android Quick Share service. The first lets certain OfflineFrame messages reach the protocol state machine after an unauthenticated connection request but before the UKEY2 handshake completes.

The second Quick Share Android flaw involves post-handshake traffic. Researchers found that three control-frame types could still be accepted in plaintext if sent as raw OfflineFrame protobufs instead of being wrapped in the expected encrypted SecureMessage layer.

Windows Quick Share bug could be more serious

Google’s help page for Quick Share between Android and Windows says users can exchange images, videos, and documents between Android devices and Windows computers that are close together.

The Windows vulnerability is a race-condition use-after-free in endpoint management. The researchers said they could reliably trigger a crash when two connections collide on the same endpoint identifier and nonce.

The paper says the crash pattern creates a plausible path to code execution because the process dereferences a freed object during a virtual function call. The researchers confirmed denial-of-service impact but did not develop a full exploit.

PlatformAttack requirementUser interactionLikely result
iOS and macOS AirDropNearby attacker while AirDrop is visibleNo click needed for V1 and V2Sharing daemon crash
Samsung Android Quick ShareNearby visible Quick Share device or same-network position for V5Depends on attack pathProtocol manipulation or control-frame injection
Quick Share for WindowsConnection race against the Windows clientNo file acceptance required for the crash path describedReliable denial of service, possible exploit path

Why proximity-sharing bugs matter

AirDrop and Quick Share work by making devices discoverable to nearby hardware. That creates convenience, but it also means exposed components must handle unexpected traffic from strangers in wireless range.

The research paper says the attacker model covers a person within AWDL, Wi-Fi Direct, or nearby wireless range. The researchers describe typical reach as around 10 to 30 meters, depending on the wireless environment.

That distance may sound limited, but it matters in airports, trains, offices, conferences, classrooms, and public events. A single attacker in a crowded area could reach many visible devices.

What users can do now

Users should reduce exposure by turning off receive modes when they do not need them. Apple users should avoid leaving AirDrop visible to everyone, especially in public spaces.

Apple’s support page says the Everyone for 10 Minutes setting reverts after 10 minutes on iPhone and iPad when users enable it for unknown contacts. Users should still switch receiving off when they finish sharing.

Android and Windows users should also review Quick Share visibility. Google’s Android help says nearby sharing depends on receive mode, visibility settings, Bluetooth, and device proximity.

  • Keep AirDrop set to Contacts Only or Receiving Off when not in use.
  • Do not leave Quick Share visible in crowded public places.
  • Install iOS, macOS, Android, Samsung, and Windows updates as soon as vendors release patches.
  • Restart a device if AirDrop, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, or Quick Share stops working unexpectedly.
  • Use stricter sharing settings on work devices that handle confidential files.

Vendor disclosure and patch status

The CISPA publication says Apple, Samsung, and Google were notified through coordinated disclosure channels.

Researchers said Apple acknowledged the AirDrop issues and had fixes in progress at the time of writing. Samsung transferred the Android Quick Share reports to Google after determining that the affected code paths came from Google Nearby/Quick Share components shipped to Samsung.

Google acknowledged the Windows Quick Share use-after-free and awarded a bounty. The researchers said the Quick Share Android issues remained under investigation when the paper was published.

What vendors should fix

The researchers recommend stronger input validation and safer failure behavior in AirDrop. They specifically call for replacing reachable fatal errors with graceful error handling, limiting XML plist nesting depth, and rejecting malformed HTTP framing.

For Quick Share, they recommend rejecting all non-handshake OfflineFrame messages until authentication completes. They also recommend enforcing decryption and integrity checks at the dispatcher level rather than leaving checks to individual handlers.

The USENIX WOOT entry lists the work as a conference paper, which means the findings form part of a broader academic review of proximity-transfer protocol security.

Vendor areaRecommended fix
AirDrop HTTP routingReturn clean errors instead of crashing on unexpected paths
AirDrop XML plist parsingSet safe nesting and body-size limits
AirDrop HTTP parserReject malformed framing before it reaches unsafe parser states
Quick Share authenticationBlock non-handshake frames before authentication completes
Quick Share encryptionVerify every post-handshake frame at a central dispatcher
Quick Share for WindowsProtect endpoint objects from race-condition use-after-free bugs

The risk is limited by range, but still important

These vulnerabilities do not let attackers strike from anywhere on the internet. The attacker must be physically nearby or, for one Quick Share scenario, positioned on the same network path during a session.

That limitation reduces the attack surface, but it does not remove the risk. Proximity attacks become more practical in dense spaces where many people keep wireless sharing features enabled.

Google’s Android Quick Share guidance tells users that receive mode can make the device visible to nearby users. That visibility is exactly why careful default settings and prompt handling matter.

What this means for AirDrop and Quick Share users

The safest short-term move is simple: keep nearby sharing features off when you are not actively using them. When you need to receive files, enable visibility only for the shortest practical time.

For businesses, the bigger lesson involves device policy. IT teams should set clear rules for AirDrop and Quick Share on managed devices, especially in sensitive environments such as finance, government, healthcare, legal work, and engineering.

Google’s Windows help page says Quick Share for Windows can receive files in the background when the app is open. That makes visibility and patching especially important on shared or work PCs.

The research does not mean users must stop using AirDrop or Quick Share. It does show that proximity-sharing tools need the same security attention as any other network-facing service.

FAQ

What are the AirDrop and Quick Share vulnerabilities?

Researchers disclosed six vulnerabilities affecting Apple AirDrop, Samsung Quick Share, and Google Quick Share for Windows. The issues include AirDrop denial-of-service crashes, Quick Share protocol-state flaws, an encryption-bypass issue, and a Windows use-after-free bug.

Can attackers crash devices through AirDrop?

Researchers found three AirDrop issues that can crash the sharing daemon when AirDrop is reachable in a visible receive mode. A crash can disrupt AirDrop and related Apple continuity services until the service recovers or the device is restarted.

Can Quick Share vulnerabilities lead to code execution?

The Windows Quick Share bug is a use-after-free race condition. Researchers confirmed reliable denial-of-service impact and described a plausible code-execution path, but they did not develop a full exploit in the paper.

How close does an attacker need to be?

For most scenarios, the attacker needs to be within nearby wireless range, which the researchers describe as roughly 10 to 30 meters depending on the environment. One Quick Share encryption-bypass scenario requires an on-path attacker on the same network.

How can users reduce the risk?

Users should turn off AirDrop or Quick Share receive modes when they do not need them, avoid broad visibility settings in public spaces, install vendor security updates promptly, and use stricter sharing policies on work devices.

Readers help support VPNCentral. We may get a commission if you buy through our links. Tooltip Icon

Read our disclosure page to find out how can you help VPNCentral sustain the editorial team Read more

User forum

0 messages